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20121 BUILDI\G A SOCIOECONOMIC CONSTITUTION1
In the boom phase the European Union was what the
British psychologist David Tuckett calls a 'fantastic
object"-an unreal but attractive object of desire. To my
mind, it represented the embodiment of an open
society-another fantastic object. It was an association
of nations founded on the principles of democracy,,
human rights, and the rule of law that is not dominated
by any, nation or nationality. Its creation was a feat of
piecemeal social engineering led by, a group of far-
sighted statesmen who understood that the fantastic
object itself was not within their reach. They
, 
set limited
objectives and firm timelines and then mobilized the
political will for a small stepfaJward, knowing full well
that when they, accomplished it, its inadequacy would
become apparent and require ajurther step.
INTROD[ICT0IN
The ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon ("Treaty") in 2009
was heralded as a new era. It was anticipated that the Treaty
would usher in a qualitative change to policynaking in Europe.
This would be achieved by rebalancing, or even recalibrating,
the previous economic priorities found in earlier treaties with a
set of social aims and values set out in Articles 2 and 3 of the
Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), tilting the European
Union towards a social, as well as a liberal economic,
constitution. The change of focus was not only attributable to a
showdown between an Anglo-Saxon (liberal economic) versus
French (prointerxentionist) model for integration but also
acknowledged the changes that have taken place in the
European Union since the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht.
This Essay examines how the Treaty contributes to the
evolution of a socioeconomic constitution for the European
1. George Soros, How to Save the Euro, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 20, 2012, available at
htp: nybooks.cm /articles/ archives/ 2 012 feb/ 23/ ho w-sawve ur( /?paginatil
-talse.
2. See Malcolm Ross, A Healthy Approach to Semices oJ General Economic Interest? The
BUPA Judgment of the Court of First Instance. 34 EuR. L. RLV. 127, 140 (2009); see also
DAGNIAR SCHIL& ECOuNOMIC AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE: THE (HALLENGE FOR
EU CONSTITUTIONALI Wa (2012).
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Union, resulting in a polity that contrasts dramatically with the
original aims of the founding fathers of the European Economic
Community ("EEC"). It also is shown that the economic
backdrop to these changes has allowed economic and
competitiveness issues to continue to dominate the policy
agenda, and values of efficiency, modernization, and a "more
economic approach" have permeated areas of social policy
normally within the competence of the Member States. Cutbacks
in public expenditure and other austerity measures create a test
for the measure and effectiveness of the new era of
socioeconomic values.
I. NEW IALUES
The most fundamental change in direction for the
European Union is found in the principles underpinning the
internal market concept. In the Treaty Establishing the
European Community ("EC Treaty"), the internal market was to
be achieved through the guiding principle in Article 4 of an
"open market economy with free competition.", In contrast, the
2009 Treaty of Lisbon alters this focus to a "social market
economy" with a set of new values of the European Union.4
These values are established in Articles 2 and 3 of the TEU with
clear indications of the role and value of solidarity in Europe,
adding to the traditional values of liberal constitutionalism
introduced by the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht. Articles 2 and 3
TEU are enhanced by a number of horizontal clauses in the
Treatv on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"),
which serve to entrench specific social values into all areas of
policy of the European Union, binding the socioeconomic
dimension and acting as a public emblem of the European
Union.
3. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art.
4. 2006 OJ. C 321 E/37, at 45.
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 3 (3) 2010 OJ. C.
83/13, at 17 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon].
5. Id. arts. 2-3, at 17; see, e.g., PAUL CRAIG, THE LISBON TREATY: LAw. POLITICS,
AND TREATY RLFORM 311-13 (2010) (arguing that the new values of human dignity and
minority rights, alongside pluralism, nondiscrimination, tolerance, justice, solidaritv,
and equality between women and men contained in Article 2 of the Treaty on
European Union ("TEU"), are values related to social, rather [han liberal,
constitutionalism).
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The new values are reinforced by Article 6 (1) of the TEU,
wvhich declares that the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the
European Union ("Charter") "shall have the same legal value as
the Treaties."' The Charter is not incorporated into the main
body of the treaties or the protocols. Additionally, several
clauses of the treaties pave the way for EU accession to the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. 7
For the first time in EU primary law, the TEU recognizes
the principle of regional and local self-government.8 Together
with the strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity, which was
first introduced by the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty
creates the idea of a pluralistic and diverse European Union that
may contribute to the strengthening of economic and social
integration.9 Thus EU policies can be developed, implemented
at the local level without centralization, and be solidaristic in
effect.
The two core economic engines of integration, the free
movement provisions and competition policy, merit a similar
qualitative need for appraisal. The single market and economic
and monetary union are now raised to EU objectives by Article 3
of the TEU. This elevation was at the expense of competition
policy; indeed, competition received less than dignified
6. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 4, art. 6(1), 2010 0I. C 83, at 19; see Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83/389 [hereinafter Charter
of Rights].
7. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 4, art. 6(2), 2010 OJ. C 83, at 19; Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 218(8), 2010 OJ.
C 83/47. at 146 [hereinafter TFEU].
8. Article 4(2) of the TEU states that the European Union will
"respect... regional and local self-government" when legislation is contenplatcd. TEU
post-Lisbon, supra note 4, art. 4(2), 2010 OJ. C 83, at 18. Article 2 of Protocol No. 2
states that the European Commission ("Commission") is obliged in its consultations,
before proposing a legislative act, to take into consideration "the regional and local
dimensions" of the envisaged act where appropriate. Protocol No. 2 on the Application
of the Principles of Subsidiarty and Proportionality art. 2, 2010 O.J. C 83/206, at 206.
Article 5 of Protocol 2 states that every draft EU legislative act must include an
assessment of its impact upon, inter alia, local and regional levels and, in the case of
draft Directives, the Commission should explain the implications for the Member
States, including any regional legislation that may be required. Id. art. 5, at 207.
9. The principle of subsidiarity is now contained in Article 5of the TEU. The
principle includes refCerences to local and regional competence. TEU post-Lisbon,
Supr note 4, art. 5 (3), 2010 O.J. 83, at 18.
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treatment. It was "removed from its lofty status of 'EU
objective' '1  originally envisaged in the Draft Constitutional
Treaty.1 Instead, competition policy was to receive even greater
ignominy. The new legal order references to "a system ensuring
that competition is not distorted" found in Article 3(1) (g) of the
EC Treaty have been deleted from the main body of the primary
Treaty and moved to Protocol No. 27, where competition is
absorbed into the principle of the internal market: "The High
Contracting Parties, considering that the internal market as set
out in Article 3 TEU includes a system ensuring that
competition is not distorted .... ",12
As if to reinforce the lesser impact of competition in the
European Union, and the recognition of the role of local and
regional government, public services receive additional
attention in Protocol No. 26, which recognizes the competence
of the Member States to "organise non-economic services of
general interest."' 3 Article 14 of the TFEU replaces Article 16 of
the EC Treaty by creating a clear legal base for EU legislation14
10. Jose Luis Buendia Sierra, Writing Straight with Crooked Lines: Competition Policy
and Services of General Econowmic nterest in the Treaty of Lisbon. in EU LAW AJTLR LISBON
347, 365 (Andrea Biondi et al. eds., 2012). Note that Buendia Sierra qualifies this
language by analyzing that, in reality, the role of competition inay be reinfirced by the
changes inade in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. This analysis is tested here in this Essay.
11. See )raft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 ().J. C 310/
(never ratified).
12. Protocol No. 27 on the Internal Market and Competition pmbl., 2010 0:. C
83/309, at 309.
13. Protocol No. 26 on Services of General Interest art. 2, 2010 O:.. C 83/308. at
308 (emuphasis added).
14. The sensitivity of the issue is revealed in the provision that the European
Parliament and the Council may adopt regulations to establish the principles
applicable to Services of General Economric Interest ("SGEF') and the conditions to
provide, commission, and fund S(GEI. However, any measures taken by the European
Union may not prejudice the comptences of the Member States. TFEU, supra note 7,
art. 14. 2010 O:J. C 83, at 54. This has created confusion in legal taxonomy because it
was always presumed that directives would be the most appropriate legal instrument if
EU legislation in the area was ever used. Even 1more ironic is the fact that after mnany
years of discussing whther it should have legal powers in this field. the (ommission
announced that it would not use the new legal powers and insead has focused upon
soft law/new governance miechanisns and processes. See Stdphane Rodrigues, Towards
a Greral EC Framework Instrumen Related to SGEI? Political Considerations and Legal
Counsairt, in MARKU-s KRAJFWSKI ET AL., THE CHANG-NG LFEC( AL FRAMFW(ORK FOR
SLRV71CLS OF GLNEL.AL INTEREST iN EUROPL: BLTWEEN (OMPLTITION AND SOLIDARITY
255 (2009); see also Erika Szyszczak, Soft Law and Safe Havens, in SoCL SERVICLS OF
GENERAL INTEREST IN THF EU 31 7 (Ulla Neergaard et al. eds., 2012). One explanation
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and continues to emphasise that public services are the shared
responsibility of the European Union and the Member States. 15
The new emphasis upon social values and the role of
solidarity is significant in a global economy increasingly leaning
towards neoliberal values and in a European economy heavily
shaken by economic recession. This Essay examines how the
primary legal documents suggest that the European Union is
developing a legal base for a potential socioeconomic
constitution through the evolution of a set of values that
underpin the integration project. The new legal base for this
constitution is analyzed within the framework of other
developments, drawing examples from the case law of the
European Courts, the new political agenda in the "Europe
2020" program, and the greater reliance in the European Union
on new ("soft") governance processes. In particular, this Essay
uses the example of how public services'6 and the role of
citizenship have developed from the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht
to the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon as indicators of the distinctive
European approach to the evolution and protection of
socioeconomic values.
for the reluctance to use the new legal base may be that current legislation and soft law
addresses state aid issues, which have a specific legal regimne in the Treaty on tie
Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"). See Erika Siy/szczak, Modernising State
Aid and the Financing of SGEI. J. ELR. COMPETITION I & PR-AC., June 2012, at 1,
http://'jeclap.oxfordjiurnals.org/contnt/arly/22/1206/07/jccap.lps35.full.pdf+
html
15. TFEU, supra note 7. art. 14. 2010 O.J. C 83, at 54.
16. The 1958 Treaty Establishing the European Econoinic Community ("EE(')
deliberatly avoided the term "public services." Instead, a new "European" concept of
SGEI was deployed in what was then Article 90(2) of the EEC (now Article 106(2) of
the TFEU). TFEU, supra note 7, art. 106(2), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 91; Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 90(2), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 50
[hercinafter EEC Treaty]. The tern "public service" was used in the "Transport"
chapter and is still found in TFEU Article 93. TFEU, supra note 7, art. 93, 2010 O.J. C
83, at 86; see Pierre Bauby, From Rome to Lisbon: SGIR in Primat
" 
Law, in DEVEL OPMENTS
IN SERVICES OF GENERAI INTEREST 19 (Erika Syszczak et al. eds., 2011). The
Commission has adopted a new generic term in soft law conmunications: "Services of
General Interest." Under this umbrella, a number of different concepts are emerging
in Commission policy documents and soft law, which can be described as a "family"
comprising inter alia: healtaicare scawices of general interest ("HSGI"), noneconomic
ser ices of general interest (-NESGI"), social services of general interest (-SS(;I"), and
SGEI. See Ulla Necrgaard, The Concept of SSGI and the Asymnnetries Between Free Movement
and Competition Law, in SOCLAL SLRVICES OF GENEKLAL INTEREST 1N THL EU (Ulla
Neergaard et al. eds., 2012).
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II. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR A SOCIOECONOMIC
CONS TITU0TION
The starting point for discussion is to analyze how the texts
of the Treaty provisions provide evidence of the aspirations of
the European Union. Article 2 of the TEU proclaims:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human
digniy, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and
respect for human rights. including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity" and equality
between women and men prevail.1 7
This can be contrasted with the original aims of integration.
The 1958 Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community ("EEC Treaty") held a clear vision of its purpose.
Article 2 of the EEC set out a number of aims:
It shall be the aim of the [European Community (the
"Communiy")], by establishing a Common Market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of
Member States, to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability,
an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer
relations between its Member States.i8
It was agreed by the founders of the EEC that these aims could,
and should, be achieved by establishing a common market and
gradually approximating the Member States' economic policies.
The common market, renamed the internal market by the 1986
Single European Act,9 was always viewed as an instrument to
enhance social welfare through a variety of objectives (that have
expanded over time) and not as an end in itsel&2° There was no
requirement for either a social or fiscal infrastructure for this
project. Thus, there was no reference to the development of a
17. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 4, art. 2, 2010 0J. C 83, at 17.
18. EEC Treaty, supra note 16. art. 2, at 15.
19. Single European Act, 1987 04. L 169/1 [hereinaftier SEA] (amending the
EEC Treaty); see ILawrence W. Gormley, The Internal Market: Histoty and Evolution, in
REGULATING THE INTERNAL MARKET 14, 14 (Nianth Nic Shuibhnc ed., 2006).
20. See RUTH N1ELSEN & ERtKA SZYSZCZaK, THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 29-36 (3d ed. 1997).
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coherent social dimension to economic integration. It was
presumed that an improvement in the standard of living within
the EEC would be an automatic by-product of increased trade
and economic integration and that the European Union lacked
the facilities to engage in full-scale redistributive policies.21 It
should be noted that the lack of discussion of the social
dimension to the EEC project also was in deference to the
Member States' desire to retain competence over their culturally
and historically specific national welfare and social systems.
2
This fact underpins the recurrent tensions found in Europe in
allocating competence in the socioeconomic field.
Even this straightforward path towards integration was beset
with difficulties. Since the 1970s, the process of integration
lacked a clear master plan. Experimentation using widening and
deepening strategies was at the expense of unanimity in
agreeing with the objectives of the integration project. This, in
turn, allowed for the creation of new modes of governance to
complement the traditional Community method of governance.
To borrow from Professor Deirdre Curtin's famous phrase
analyzing the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht, the integration project
appears as a fragmented series of "bits and pieces. " 23 This
description is particularly apt for the evolution of a
socioeconomic constitution for the European Union.
What is distinctive about the EU project, and what
distinguishes it from other forms of economic trade agreements,
is that, over time, EU law and policy has taken a more nuanced
approach towards socioeconomic values and rights protected in
law and policy at the national level. This contrasts with other
regional approaches, and contrasts sharply when compared with
developments in the United States. For example, Greg Albo,
Sam Gindin, and Leo Panitch describe the global neoliberal
globalization leanings from a United States' perspective as the
following:
Since at least the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the
U.S. and other states have embraced an ideology of scaling
21. See id.
22. Seegenerall Doreen Collins, Social Polic, in INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUITY 97 &Ju1ict Lodge ed., 1983).
23. Deirdre Curtin. The Constitutional Structure of the LUion: A Europe of Bits and
Pieces, 30 COMMON MKT. I . REV. 17,22 (1993).
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back the role of government in economic life and letting
the invisible hand of the unfettered market work its magic.
Rhetoric notwithstanding, this has not meant a withdrawal of
the state from regulating economic activity nor from an
active role in managing class relations. Instead, it has
signaled the institutionalization of public policies and state
regulation directed at increasing the power of the dominant
capitalist firms in industry as well as financial markets and
an enhanced role for markets in determining income
distribution and public priorities. This political project has
become associated in all parts of the world with the term
neoliberalism. . . 24
In contrast, from the 1970s, the Member States,25 the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or "Court"), and the EEC
Institutions were aware of the need for a social dimension to
economic integration, even when resistance to expanding
legislative competence in the political forum was evident from
the Member States2 The ECJ acknowledged in Defirenne v.
SociOM Anonvme Bege de Navigation Adrienne Sabena ("Dejrenne
If') 27 that the isolated equal pay for equal work provision of
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty (now Article 157 of the TFEU)
formed part of the social objectives of the EEC, which was not
merely an economic union but also sought, by common action,
to ensure social progress and to seek the constant improvement
of the living and working conditions of the people of Europe28
The Court states that "this double aim, which is at once
economic and social, shows that the principle of equal pay forms
part of the foundations of the community."2 9
24. GREG AI.BO, SAM (INDIN & ILEO PANTICH, IN AN) OUT OF CRIsIS: THE GLOBAL
FiNANCLAL MELTDOWN AND) LEFT ALTLRNATIVLS 27 (2010).
25. See, for example, the Statement from the Paris Summit in 1972 declaring that
the "Heads of State or Heads of Government attach as much importance to vigorous
action in the social fields as to the achievemnent of the Economic and Monctary Union."
Meetings of the Heads of State or Government, 10 E.C. BuI., at 19, 6 (1972),
available at http://aci.pitt.cdu/1919/2/paris-1972-coniluniquc.pdE
26. NIELSEN & SZYSZCZ K, supra note 20. at 17-21.
27. Defrenne v. Societ Anonyme Belge de Navigation Arienne Sabena (Defenne
11), Case 43/75. [1976] E.C.R. 455.
28. See id. [[ 10-12. Ar ticle 119 of the EEC was introduced for competition
reasons. In initial drafts of the EEC Treaty, it was included in the "Competition"
chapter, not in the ad hoc set of "social" clauses. See NIELSEN & SZYSZCLZK, supa note
20, at 23-24.
29. Dbenne , [1976] E.C.R. 455, 1 12.
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The ECJ has continued to reiterate the same aspirations for
European integration. In both International Transportation
Workers' Fedederation v. Viking Line ABP and Laval un Partneri Ltd.
v. Svenska Byggniadsarbetaref6ybundet, for example, the Court
stated that the EU has not only an economic but also a social
purpose.30 In the same political era as the Defrenne Hjudgment,
the Court also recognized that the Member States retained a
broad discretion to defend national public, social, and welfare
interests against encroachment from the effects of the
expanding fundamental economic free movement rules. In
Cassis de Dijon, 31 a case on the free movement of goods, the
Court expanded the grounds of overriding public interests upon
which the Member States can rely, subject to the principles of
proportionality and nondiscrimination, when justifying
restrictions to the fundamental freedoms.2 These overriding
public interests have allowed Member States to uphold a
number of potentially restrictive rules and practices in their
welfare states, even when they restrict the free movement in the
European Union, and even where they purport to protect the
financial (economic) viability of the welfare state in EuropeY,
This process has allowed EU lal to absorb a set of noneconomic
30. See Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n v. Viking Line ABP. Case (-438/05. [2007]
E.C.R. 1-10779, 79; ILaval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetarefi~rbundet,
Case (-341/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-11767. [ 105. Note, however. that the outcome of these
judgments resulted in a preference for economic ains of integration over social
concerns. See Danny Nicol, Europe's Lochner Moment, 2011 PUB. I 308, 328.
31. Rcwc-Zentral A.G. v Bundesmnonopolverwalltng ffir Brannnwein (Cassis de
Dijon), Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649.
32. See Cassis de Dijon, [1979] E.C.R. 649, I 8 Examples include: consumer
protection. the efftctiveness of fiscal supeivision, thre protection of public health, tihe
fairness of commercial transactions, tire protection of ftindamiental rights, and the
protection of the environment. See. g., id.; Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale
Transporte und Planzge v. Austria, Case C- 112/00. [2003] E.C.R. 1-5659, 1[ 66;
Commission v. Denmark, Case 302/86. [1988] E.C.R. 4607, [' 8-9: Cinethiquc SA v.
Federation Nationale des Cinrmas Fran.ais, Joined Cases 60-61/84, [1985] E.C.R.
2605. [ 26.
33. This is seen, tor example, in cases involving healthcare issues where a Member
State may raise questions of economic viability under the guise of maintaining a high
level of national health protection. See, e.g., V.G. Miller-Faurd6 v. Onderlinge
Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA, Case (-385/99. [2003] E..R. I
4509; Vanbraekel v. Alliance Nationale des Mutualits Chretiennes, Case (-368/98,
[2001] E.C.R. 1-5363: B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Zickenfids VGZ. Case C-
157/99. [2001] E.C.R. 1-5473. [ 79: Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, Case C-
158/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1931.
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values that must be balanced against the free market rules, but
at the same time has signalled to the Member States that where
economic activity engages EU law, the Member States cannot
draw a tight, or impenetrable, veil over national policy.
11. IN RETROSPECT: THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIOECONOMIC
RIGHTS IN THE EUROPELN UNION
From the Single European Act 1986, the competence for
centralized regulation of the integration aims increased the
competence of the European Community/European Union
("EC/EU") in embracing legislative measures not wholly related
to the market freedoms, or the internal market. ,4 Within the
legal base of the internal market (now Article 114(3) of the
TFEU), there is recognition that when the Commission initiates
proposals concerning health, safety, environmental protection,
and consumer protection, it will take as a base a high level of
protection, and within their respective powers, the European
Parliament and the Council also will seek to achieve these
objectives) 5 At the same time, ECiEU competence has been
tempered by respect for the subsidiaritv principle introduced by
the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht and the proportionality principle.
The 1993 Treaty of Maastricht signalled a poliical direction
towards widening the ambit of European integration to
encompass a wider set of political and socioeconomic aims. The
Treaty introduced a set of traditional European values into
primary law: democracy, liberty, respect for fundamental
freedom, and respect for human rights. But, the transition
from the domination of an economic market ideology to
include a social dimension was stifled by the failure to agree in a
number of policy areas or to vest significant legislative
competences in the social area. This left the establishment of a
socioeconomic governance to rely upon development as a by-
product of case law or to depend upon softer new governance
processes. Significantly, in 1994 the European Commission
created a concept of the "European Social Model" in policy
34. See SEA. -@1a note 19: see also Manfid E. Streit & Werner Mussier, The
Economic Con , it ior o the Eropean Community: From "Rome"to "UMaastricl,"1 EUR. L.J. 5
(1995).
35. TFEU, supranote 7, art. 114(3), 2010 O4. C 83, at 94.
36. TEU pos-L isbon, supra note 4, pmbl, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 15.
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documents 7. This soft law signals recognition of the need for
greater centralizing concepts of socioeconomic factors that are
emerging through negative and positive forms of integration.
Such use of soft law was instrumental in preparing the ground
for the modernization of the internal market project post-2009.
One of the most important new concepts to be enshrined
in the primary law of the European Union at Maastricht was the
concept of EU citizenship. Y Initially viewed as merely symbolic,
inconsequential, uninspiring, toothless, embarrassing, and
meaningless, 39 the idea of "citizenship" provided the seed for
the germination of new forms and roles of citizenship and has
appeared in the post-Treaty of Lisbon era.40
Working with the basic concept of EU citizenship, now
found in Article 20 of the TFEU, the ECJ declared that: "Union
citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals
of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the
same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of
their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly
provided for."41
The traditional focus of EU citizenship has been the
expansion of migrant's rights with respect to social and
economic benefits in the host state.42 This has challenged the
nature of social welfare benefits normally associated with
37. Statement to Parliament by Mr. Delors, President of the Commission, and His
Reply to the Ensuing Debate, E.C. BULL. SUPP., no. 1/86, at 9 (1986), available at
http:/iaei.pitt.ediu/8524i /8524.pdf (describing Jacques Delors' related concept of a
"European Social Area." introduced in the 1980s).
38. TFEU, supra note 7, art. 20. 2010 O. C 83, at 56-57: see ERIKA SZYSZL(AK, EC
IABOU R ILAW 176 (2000) (explaining the concept of the citizen-worker); see also jIM
DAI,ES, THE EL ROPEAN CONSUMER CITIZEN IN IAW AND POLIY (2011) (discussing the
concept of the consumer-citizen); Francis Jacobs, Citizenship of the European Union-A
Leg-a1Analysis, 13 EL R. I,1 591, 591 (2007).
39. See generally Joseph Weiler, European Ctizenship and Human Ri hts. in
RFORMING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION: THE LEGAL DEBATE 57 Jan A. W intcr ct
al. eds., 1996).
40. See infra Part III (discussing the new Citizens Initiative linked to consumer
policy in the internal market).
41. (rzelczyk v. Centre Public d'aide Sociale d'Otgnies-Loiivain-la-Neuve, Case
C-184/99. [2001] E.C.R. 1-6193, [ 31.
42. See Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, Case (-209/03. [2005] E.C.R. 1-2119,
19 (discussing financial assistance given to foreign sudents); see also Van )ellft v.
College voor Zorgverzekeringen, Case C-345/09, [2010] E.C.R. I 39 (delivered
Oct. 14, 2010) (1o1 yet reported) (noting the pension benefits of non-Meimber State
residents).
1376 FORDHAM IN\TERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1364
citizenship rights within bounded areas of the nation state and
raised issues of financing social welfarei" A recent ECJ ruling
suggests that this may be a far-reaching incursion into the
national autonomy of the Member States to regulate social
rights, normally perceived as outside of the legislative
competence of EU law.44 In Zambrano, the Court stated that
Article 20 of the TFEU precludes every national measure that
has the effect of depriving Union citizens of the rights conferred
by the Treaty.45 The effects of liberalization have shattered the
bounded spaces of European welfare schemes with suggestions
that new forms of universal service obligations may provide a
nucleus for new forms of consumer social rights, not necessarily
provided by the state or national providers.46
The political compromises of the 1986 Single European
Act, and the 2000 Treaty of Nice, did not see a significant shift
towards transferring further powers in the social field to the
EC/EU. Concurrent attempts to create a human rights charter
in primarv law, for example through the Community Charter of
the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers47 and a Charter of
Fundamental Rights for the EU48 remained outside of the
primary legal documents, and did not receive unanimous
support from the Member States.49
43. See generly MAURIZIO FERRERA, THE BOUNDARIES OF WELFARE: Et ROPEAN
INTEGRATION ANT) THE NEW SPATIAL POLITICS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION (2005)
(discussing cooperation and solidarity among EU citizens).
44. See Zambrano v. Oflice National de l'Emploi (ONEn), Case C-34/09, [2011]
E.C.R. I (delivered Mar. 8, 2011) (not yet reported).
45. See id. [[ 40-42.
46. See Hans-A. Micklitz, Vrive sal Services: lVadeusfJor a Social Eurpean Private Law
10 (Eur. Univ. inst., Working Paper No. 12, 2009), available at http://cadtnus.eui.cu/
bitstream /handle/1814/12238/LAW_2009_ 2. pdj sessionid-52B4B2C BB4A5AF395Ak6
IA0338FF4FC87?sequence-1 (discussing the efIect of universal service relations on
citizen's rights); see also Jim Davies & Erika Szyszczak, Liversal Serice Obligations:
Fultlling New Generations of Senices of General Economic Interest. in DEVELOPMENTS IN
SERVICES OF GENERAI INTEREST, spr#a note 16, at 155 (expanding on civil rights now
potentially available fir EU citizens).
47. Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, EUROFOUND (Jan.
13, 2011), (vailable at http:/iww .aedh.e/plugins/fckeditor/iiserilesiilei
( onveintions'( 20interiationales/ ( ommunity_( harter of the FundamentalSocial_
Rights of Workers.pd.
48. Charter of Rights, supra note 6, 2010 O.J. C 83/389.
49. The UK government, under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, did not sign
the Charter of Fundamental Rights ("Charter"). It was not until [le Labour
government of Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1997 that the Charter was signed by the
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The Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 introduced a number of
new social norms with greater emphasis upon human rights and
welfare-related policies, inter alia, a broad competence for the
EU to create nondiscrimination law (Aiticle 13 of the EC Treaty,
now Article 19 of the TFEU). This significant milestone in the
political development of the EU was partly in response to
political pressures and in reaction to the increase in litigation
using existing Treaty (and secondary law) provisions to develop
concepts of economic and political citizenship.
Aticle 13 of the EC Treatyv went further than existing
provisions on equality between men and women and nationality
discrimination. Specifically, it provided the European Union
with a legal base to develop legislation on equal treatment
grounds, including: age, disability, ethnicity, religion, and sexual
orientation. This legal base has been used sparingly with only
three major pieces of legislation emerging: a directive on equal
treatment on the grounds of racial and ethnic origin,50 a
United Kingdom. The prcamble to the 1993 Treaty on European Union confirmed the
Member States' "attachment to fundamental social rights as defined in the European
Social Charter... and in the 1989 (Onmunity Charter," and Article 151 of the Social
Chapter of the TFEU states: "The Union and the Member States, having in mind
fundamental social rights such as those set out in the European Social Charter ... and
in the 1989 (ommunity (hartcr of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers." TEU
post-ILisbon, supra note 4, pmbl., 2010 O.J C 83, at 15; TFEU, supra note 7, art. 151.
2010 o.J. C 83, at 114. Thus, the Charter could be used by the European Court of
,Justice as an interpretative tool in cases concerned with social and labor rights. The
Charter was not incorporated into the EC Treaties by the Treat of Nice 2000 but was
solemnly proclaimed" by the European Parliament. Council of Ministers. and
European Commission, but not by the Member States, at Nice on )ecember 7, 2000,
and was published in the "C" series of the Oflicial Journal of the EU at 2000 04. C
364/1. The Treaty of Lisbon 2009 did not incorporate the Charter into the TEU or
TFEU, or even include it as a Protocol. Instead, an amended Charter was solemnly
proclaimed and signed in Strasbourg by the Presidents of the European Parliament,
the Council, and the European Commission on December 12, 2007. which was the day
before the Treat of Lisbon was signed by the Representatives of the Member States.
Article 6(1) of the TEU states that the Charter "shall have the same legal value as the
Treaties." TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 4, art. 6(1), 2010 O.1. C 83, at 19. However.
there are additional protocols relating to the application of the Charter to the Czech
Republic, Poland, and the United Kingdom. For background on the Charter. see
generally )avid Anderson & Cian C. Murphy, The Charter of Fundamental Rights. in EU
L.w AITER LISBON 155 (Andrea Biondi et al. eds., 2012)
50. Council Directive 2000/43/EC Implementing the Principle of Equal
Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, 2000 O.J.
L 180/22.
1378 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1364
directive on equal treatment in employment and occupation,51
and a directive outside the employment sphere implementing
the principle of equal treatment between women and men in
the access to and supply of goods and services. 52 A proposal for a
directive on equal treatment between persons, irrespective of
religion, belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation has lingered
on the negotiating table since 2008.53 Instead, the European
Union has resorted to softer processes to implement a wider
range of nondiscrimination programs.
Axticle 2 of the TEU is not an entirely new provision, but
combines the range and changes in perception of the purpose
of integration, through various Treaty amendments and case law
of the ECJ.
III. ARTICLE 3 OF THE TEU SOCIAL VALUES AS OBJECTIVES
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Axticle 3 of the TEU is more expansive than Axticle 2 in
stating a set of social values as objectives of the European Union,
with an underpinning theme of solidarity) 4 Central to these
51. Council )irective 2000/78/EC Establishing a General Framework for Equal
Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 20000 j. L 303/16.
52. Council Directive 200(/)43/E( Implementing the Principle of Equal
Treatment Between Men and Women in the Access to and Supply of Goods and
Services, 2004 OJ. L 373/37.
53. Commission of the European Communities, Council Directive on
Implementing the Principle ol Equal Treatment Betw..een Persons Irrespective ol
Religion or Belief. Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation, COM (2008) 426 Final (July
2008).
54. TEU post-ILisbon, supra note 4, art. 3, 2010 (.J. 83, at 17 (" 1. The Union's aim
is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. 2. The Union shall
ofter its citizens an area of fIreedom, security and justice without internal fiontiers, in
which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate
measures with respect to external border conUols, asylun, immigration and the
prevention and combating of crime. The Union shall establish an internal market. It
shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic
growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market econonly, aiming at fhll
employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of
the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. It
shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and
protection, equalit) between women and men, solidarity between generations and
protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial
cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its rich cultural and
linguistic diversi , and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and
enhanced. 4. The Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose
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provisions is the controversial new concept of "a highly
competitive social market economy," which has received
differing analysis and interpretation. At its most simple level, it
could be interpreted as a continuum, and a legal definition of
the concept of the "European Social Model" developed by the
Commission in soft law policy documents.
Loic Azoulai comments that the concept of "a highly
competitive social market economy," inspired by German ordo-
liberal thinking, corresponds to the desire to create a social
counterbalance to market considerations. 55  According to
Azoulai, the concept contains the idea that European
integration should not be pursued to the detriment of the
integrity of the social systems of the Member States but the
means for developing a social Europe are in fact limited. This
is because the concept of a "social market economy" is
circumscribed by the words: high, competitive. Constanze
Semmelmann also argues that the words restrict and define the
concept, limiting EU social policy to market-based measures.
Thus, according to Semmelmann, "the concept of the 'social
market economy' amounts to a rather cosmetic and rhetorical
step." 57 Similarly, Christian Joerges argues that: "The social
market economy remains embedded in the substantive and
currency is the cure. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and
promote its values and interests and contribute to tihe protection of its citLizens. It shall
contribute to peace, securit,, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and
mutual respect among peoples, free and fair uade, eradication of poverty and the
protection of human rights, in particular tire rights of the child, as well as to tile strict
observance and the development of international law, including respect fbr the
principles of the United Nations Charter. 6. The Union shall pursue its objectives by
appropriate means commensiurate with the courpetences which are conferred upon it
in tihe Treaties.").
55. ILoic Azoulai, The Court oJJus ce and the Social iarket Economy: The Emergence of
Tn Ide and the Con ditions for Its iatio,, 45 COMMON MKT. L. RLV. 1335, 1337
(2008); see Christian Joergc. A Renaissare oJ the Eurpean Economic Constitution?, in
INTLGRATING WELFARL FUNCTIONS INT1Or EU LAW: FROM ROME TO IASBON 29 (Ulla
Neergaard et al. eds., 2009) (providing background information on the EU provisions).
56. Azoulai, supar note 55. at 1337.
57. Constanze Semmelmann, The European Union's Economic Constitution Londer the
Lisbon Treaty: Soul-Searching Among Lawyers Shifts the Focus to Procedue. 33 ELR. L. RLV.
516, 521 (2010); see Commission of tire European Communities, Towards a Single
Market Act for a Highly Competitive Social Market Economy: Colmlunication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Connittee of the Regions, COM (2010) 608 Final (Oct. 2010).
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institutional provisions on economic and monetary policy; the
economic liberties remain in place." 58
It has been suggested that the role and significance of the
new concept will be played out by its use in Commission strategy
and judgments of the European Courts, where it may play a
teleological role in the interpretation of Union law.5 - For
example, the use of the concept, and an explanation of what it
entails, has found its way into the Commission's vision of
competition policy:
Our competition policy is the expression of the model born
in Europe after World War II and known as "social market
economy". Competition policy, contrary to what some think,
is not about neo-liberalism or the jungle. Its purpose is
completely different and positive. Competition policy in
Europe is about encouraging entrepreneurship and
innovation, the creation of jobs and the placing in the
market of innovative products and services that bring choice
and competitive prices for the consumer. The role of
competition enforcers is to make sure companies play fair,
do not gain excessive power and when they acquire power
through organic growth, not to abuse it. Competition
policy, therefore. has a regulator role and this role is
essential to preserve a social economy and social
fairness .... To apply a phrase coined by Karl Schiller, a
German minister during the late 60s. early 70s, competition
policy is about "the market when possible, the state where
necessar
'a .6o
IV. HORIZONTAL CLA USES
The TFEU enhances the evolution of the socioeconomic
constitution by increasing the horizontal clauses of the Union.
Article 7 of the TFEU states that "[tihe Union shall ensure
consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its
objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of
58. Joerges, supra note 55, at 30.
59. Erika Szyszczak, Legal Tools in the Liberalisation of We1fare A arkets, in
INTEGRATING NVLLFARE FUNCTIONS INTo EU LAW: FROM ROME TO LISBON, supra note
55, at 279, 280.
60. Joaqufn Ahnunia, Vice Prcsidcnt, Eur. Conum'n Responsible for Competition
Poliyw, Spech on Regulacao e Competitividade in Lisbon: How Competition Policy
Contributes to Competitiveness and Social Cohesion "Europa 2011" (Jan. 14, 2011).
20121 BUILDI\G A SOCIOECONOMIC CONSTITUTION 1381
conferral of powers."' ' Article 8 of the TFEU is a version of the
equality/ nondiscrimination clause found in the old Article 3(2)
of the EC Treaty: "In all its activities, the Union shall aim to
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men
and women. ' ' 62 This concept is expanded and complemented in
Article 10 of the TFEU: "In defining and implementing its
policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation." <  Of most
significance, and expectation, is a new horizontal social clause in
Article 9 of the TFEU: "In defining and implementing its
policies and activities, the Union shall take into account
requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of
employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the
fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education,
training and protection of human health. "6 4
V. THE ROLE OF COMPETITION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET
According to TEU Aticle 51, protocols have the same legal
status as the Treaties.65 Saskia Lavrijssen has argued that Article
3(1) (b) of the TFELU may be seen as assuming the function of
the former Article 3(1) (g) of the EEC Treaty .6 But the move to
a Protocol has led to speculation that the significance of
competition for the Union may have been "downgraded" by the
2009 Treaty of Lisbon. For example, Andreas Weitbrecht argues
that "ensuring that competition in the internal market is not
61. TFEU, supr note 7, art. 7,2010 O.J. C. 83, at 53.
62. Id. art. 8, at 53.
63. Id. art. 10, at 53.
64. Id. art. 9, at 53; see JEAN-CLAUDE PIR1S, THE I SBON TREATY: A I EAT ANT)
PoLITICAL ANALYSIS (2010) ;I)ragana I)amjanovic & Bruno I)e Witte, 1elfare Integration
Through EU Law: The Overall Picture in the Light of the Lisbon Treaty, in 1NTEGRATING
WELFARE F1NCTIONS INTO EU I AW: FROM ROME TO lISBON, s-pra note 55, at 53;
Maurizio Ferrera, Mapping the Co).ponents of Social EU A Critical Anaysis of the Curent
Institutional Patchwork, in EUROPE 2020: TOWARDS AMORE SOCIAL EU? 45 (Eric Marlier
& David Natali eds., 2010); Maurizio Ferrera, TheJCAIS Annual Lecture: National Wefiure
States and European Integration: In Search of a 'Virtuous Nesting,' 47 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 219 (2009).
65. See TEiU post-I isbon, supra note 4, art. 51, 2010 OJ. C 83, at 44 (stating that
[t] he Protocols and Annexes to the Treaties shall torm an integral part thercof').
66. See Saskia Lavrijsscn, What Role for National Competition Authorities in Protecting
cCorpettion InterestsYAfterLisbonP, 35 FUR. I. REV. 636, 637 (2010).
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distorted has been one of the fundamental activities of the
European Union" from Art. 3(g) of the EEC Treaty onwards.
However, after the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2(3) of the
TFEU "no longer refers to such a system" and "[u]ndistorted
competition is now only mentioned in a tersely-worded Protocol
on the Internal Market and Competition." While the
Competition Commissioner attempted "to downplay the
significance of this change as one of mere semantics,"
Weitbrecht argues that this revision may be a "starting point for
a different role of competition in the European Union over the
next 50 years."6 7
Constanze Semmelmann points out that the chapter on
competition remains virtually unaltered in the new Treaty and
the new Article 3(3) of the TEU is yet to be read in conjunction
with Protocol 27 on the Internal Market and Competition
attached to the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. In legal terms, "the
Protocol enjoys the rank of primary law so that there is no
impact on the legal status of competition as a goal of the
European Union." The fact that competition will be made a part
of the internal market "reflects the approach that considered
competition rules and the free-movement rules as two sets of
rules with the same overarching goal, namely to abolish
obstacles to cross-border trade." However, Semmelmann is
willing to concede that there could be a political weakening of
competition as a value in itself, arguing that: "This would
amount to a weakening of the economic element in the
economic constitution as opposed to the interventionist
pattern. "68
The removal of competition to one of the "barns" of the
Treaties had led Ren6 Barents to question whether this removed
the constitutional value of competition as one of the
"cornerstones of the economic constitution of the EU.'(9 In
67. Andreas Weitbrecht, From Feiburg to Chc, -o and Beyond: The Firs 50 Years oJ
European Competition Law. 29 EUR. COMPLTITION L. RLV. 81, 88 (2008).
68. Semrnelmann, Supra note 57, at 52 1.
69. Rcnd Barents, Constitutional Horse Trading: Some Comments on the Protocol on the
Internal Market and Competition, in VILWS OF EUROPLAN L.AW FROM THL MOUNTAIN:
LIBER AMICORUM PIETJAN SLOT 123, 126 (Mielle Bulterman et al. eds., 2009) (citation
omitted). For a more detailed discussion, see Erika Szyszczak, Controlling Dominance in
European Marets, 33 FORI-JAM INTIL L.J. 1738. 1748-50 (2010). Cf Weitbrecht, supra
note 67, at 88 (arguing that while Neelie Kroes, the Commissioner for Competition at
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contrast, Ulla Neergaard has argued that the insertion of the
objective of creating a social market economy, combined with
the horizontal clause of Article 7 of the TFEU could lead to a
horizontal application of social market objectives across areas of
EU law hitherto immune from social concerns. 70 jose Buendia
Sierra, in a balanced and reasoned interpretation of the
amendments, has suggested that competition could be
strengthened after the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. This Essay will
pursue this interpretation when analyzing the use of a "more
economic approach" towards public services and the
modernization of the procurement rules.71
There is evidence that the Commission is using the change
of focus of the internal market and competition policy, by
reorienting the role of competition in relation to
accommodating the special need of public services, exemplified
in soft law communications and speeches by the Vice President
of the Commission, Joaquim Almunia, who is responsible for
competition policy. 72 This confirms the prediction made by
Buendia Sierra that the competition provisions may be
strengthened by the constitutional changes in the Treaties.7,
Even in relation to gray areas of competition policy where the
social-welfare provisions of the Member States are under
scrutiny, the Commission has used the concept of a highly
competitive social market economy to justify modernization
the time of the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, sought to downplay the changes
as mere semantics and argued that the Commission would not change its "more
economic" approach to enforcement and policy, this revision may well turn out to be
the starting point for a diflerent role of competition in the European Union over the
next fifty years). On the constitutional value of competition in the earlier Treaties, see
Karel Van Miert, European Commi'r tor Competition, Speech at the Comm. on Econ. &
Monetary Affairs of the Eur. Parliament in Brussels, Belgium, Speech/93/13 (Feb. 19,
1993), during which competition was described as "one of the instruments towards the
fundamental goals laid out in the Treaty-nafely the establishment of a common
market, [and] the approximation of economic policy." See also Courage Ltd. v. Crehan,
Case C-453/99. [2001] E.C.R. 1-6297. 1[ 19-20: Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton
Int'l NV. Case C-126/97. [1999] E.C.R. 1-3055. [ 36; Wilhclm v. Bundeskartellamt., Case
14/68, [1969] E.C.R. 1, It 4-5.
70. See supa note 16.
71. See Buendia Sierra, sup a note 10.
72. The speeches of the European Commissioner for Competition can be lound
at htlp://cc.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/almunia/headlines/speeches/index_
en.ahlll.
73. See Buendia Sierra, supra note 10.
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reforms to make these services efficient and more responsive to
consumer needs. From a competition perspective, the treatment
of public services post-Treaty of Lisbon reveals a differentiated
approach: excluding social public services from the application
of the state aid rules and adopting a more robust approach
towards larger commercially orientated public seirxices. 74
The European Courts have been skillful in avoiding the
application of the competition rules to "social" activities of the
state by finding that there is no "economic" activity involved, or
finding that there is no "undertaking" involved. 75 This, however,
may take too wide an area of economic activities pursued by the
state (or contracted out by the state) outside of the ambit of EU
law. The different ways in which the Member States are choosing
to implement reform and modernization of the traditional
welfare state in Europe may lead to restrictions in choice of
models in order to avoid the full force of the internal market
and competition rules, or result in an uneven playing field in
74. The Commission embarked upon a review of the financing of public services
and the state aid rules and in December 2011 adopted a revised set of measures. For
communications that clarity key concepts related to state aid, see generally
Communication from the Commission on the Application of the European Union
State Aid Rules to Compensation Granted for the Provision of Services of General
Economic Interest. 2012 OJ. C 8/4; ( onmission Decision on the Application of Ai ticle
106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State Aid in the
Form of Public Service CoLpensation Granted to Certain Undertakings Entrusted with
the Operation of Services of General Economic Interest, 2012 O.. L 7/3;
Communication irom the Commission, European Union Framework for State Aid in
the Form of Public Service Comnpensation (2011), 2012 OJ. C 8/15. Additionally, the
(ommission made a proposal for a de ininmis regulation in the field of SGE1. See
Commission Communication on Approval of the Content of a )raft fbr a Commission
Regulation on de Miimis Aid for the Provision of Services of General Economic
nterest, 212 OJ. C 8/23. The regulation was adopted on April 25, 2012. See
Commission Regulation No. 360/2012 on the Application of Articles 107 and 108 of
the Treat on the Functioning of the European Union to de Minimis Aid Granted to
Undertakings Providing Services of General Economic Interest, 2012 O:J. L 114/8. The
Commission also adopted a Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in
Europe. See (ommission of the European (ommunities, A Quality Framework for
Services of General Interest in Europe: Comnnunication fr om the (ommission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Comuittee of the Regions, (OM (2011) 900 Final (Dec. 2011). For analysis of this
legislation, see Szyszczak, sp1a note 14.
75. Klaus Ho1fner & Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, Case C-41/90, [1991] E.C.R.
1-1979, 11 19-21 (noting that the concept of an "undertaking" is used in the treaties
and by the Comuission and [le European Courts in competition law to denote a
business/firm engaged in an economic activity).
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the internal market. Other examples show that European Courts
are accepting wide latitude for the Member States in organizing
social services as a service of general economic interest deserving
special treatment under competition rules.76 There are some
examples where the ECJ has referred to the importance of social
objectives when applying competition law. For example, in
Albany, International BV v. Stichting BedriJfpensioenfonds
Textielindustrie the Court states:
[I]t is important to bear in mind that, under Article 3 (g)
and (i) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Aiticle
3(1) (g) and (j) EC), the activities of the Community are to
include not only a 'system ensuring that competition in the
internal market is not distorted' but also 'a policy in the
social sphere'. Aiticle 2 of the EC Treaty (now, after
amendment, Article 2 EC) provides that a particular task of
the Community is 'to promote throughout the Community
a harmonious and balanced development of economic
activities' and 'a high level of employment and of social
protection'. 77
This raises the question as to whether there is a two-tier (or
multiple) application of competition law emerging in the
European Union. In relation to cases not involving public
services, the tendency appears to be an endorsement of Neelie
Kroes' robust "business as usual" approach towards the role of
competition in the single market. 7s Since the 1990s, the role of
economic analysis has grown in importance with the
Commission pursuing "a more economic approach" towards
policy formulation and case law enforcement.79 The perception
76 See. e.g., BPA & Others v. Commission, Case T-289/03, [2008] E.C.R. 11-81,
l 99, 100-01.
77. Albany Int'l BV v. Stichting Bedrjf-pensioenfonds Textielindustrie, Case C-
67/96. [1999] E.C.R. 1-5751,1[ 54.
78. Commission Press Release, MEMO/07/250 (June 23, 2007) (statement of
Neelie Kroes, European Commission for Competition, on results of June 21-22
European Council-Protocol on Internal Market and Competition). Case law post-
Trca) of Lisbon 2009 also suggests that the European Courts have not altered their
approach. See, e.g., AG(2R Prevoyance v. Beaudout Pere et Fils SARI, Case C-437/09,
[2011] E.C.R. 1 , [1[ 28-39 (delivered Mar. 3, 2011) (not yet reported);
Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, Case C-52/09. [2011] E.C.R. 1 ,
20-23 (delivered Feb. 17, 2011) (notyet reported).
79. See Alberto Pera, Changing Views of Competition, Economic Analysis and EC
Antitrust Law, 4 EUR. COMPLTITION.J. 127, 141-45 (2008); see also Lavrijssen, supra note
66, at 636.
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was that the aims of the competition provisions emanated from
economic theory, such as "consumer welfare" or "efficiency," 8(
with competition law finding it difficult to embrace wider social
or public interests,"'
V1. THE MODERNIZATION OF THE INTER\AL IARKET
The change in the position of competition policy in the
Treaty is counterbalanced by the elevation of the establishment
of the internal market and of monetary and economic union to
Union objectives in Article 2 of the TEU; previously, these aims
were viewed as merely instrumental. The single (or internal)
market objective has been modernized, within the overall new
policy program, "Europe 2020," allowing for a wider range of
consumer-citizen ideas to emerge and with a greater emphasis
upon a social dimension to the provision of goods and services
in competitive markets.8 2 The emerging concept of the social
market economy is seen as a market with greater responsiveness
to people as consumers. For example, in the Report on
Delivering a Single Market to Consumers and Citizens, it is
suggested by the European Parliament Committee on the
Internal Marlket and Consumer Protection:
[IT]hat the old perception of the single market should be
supplemented in order to make it more inclusive; stresses
that all those involved in shaping and implementing the
single market need to adopt a more holistic approach, fully
integrating citizens' concerns .. that a stronger, deeper
and expanded single market of vital importance for growth
and job creation... [and] that the single market should be
80. See, e.g., GlaxoSmnith]linc Se vs. Unlimited & Others v. Comnission, Joined
Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 1, C-515/06 P & C-519/06 1, [2009] E.C.R. 1-9291, [6 62-
63.
81. See ALBERT SANCHEZ GRAELLS. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND THE EU
COMPETITION RU4 ITS 97-98, 100 (2011). For a discussion of the role of noneconomic
interests in EU competition law, see generally OURGIHENE ODUJU, THE BOUNDARIES OF
EC COMPLTITION LANW: THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 81 (2006); CHRISTOPHER TOWNLEY,
ARTICLE 81 E( AND PFUBIIC POLICY (2009); IPieter Kalbfleisch, The Assessmert ofJInterests
in Competition Law: A Balancing Act. in ECoNoIic LAW AND JUSTICE IN TIME OF
GLOBALISATION: WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT UND JUSTIZ IN ZEIT1N DER GLOBALISERUN, 455
(Mario Monti et al. eds., 2007); Giorgio Monti, Atcle 81 EC atnd Public Policy, 39
C OMMON MKT. L. RLV. 1057 (2002).
82. See Europe 2020, EUR. COMMISSION, htp://ec.curopa.cu/curopc2020/i/i~ex-
en.htm# (last updatedJune 14, 2012).
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central in achieving the goal of a sustainable and highly
competitive social market economy in the context of the EU
2020 Strategy's longterm vision.8 3
In a Communication from the Commission concerning the
Single Market, an understanding of the significance of social
market economy is put forward:
In a social market economy, a more unified European
market in services means being able to ensure, with no race
to the bottom, that businesses are able to provide their
services more easily throughout the European
Union ... whilst at the same time providing more high
quality jobs and a high level of protection for workers and
their social rights .... More broadly, social and territorial
cohesion is a prime importance for European integration,
which acknowledges that market forces alone cannot
provide an adequate response to all collective needs.
Services of general economic interest (SGEIs) are essential
building blocks of the European social model that is both
highly competitive and socially inclusive.8 4
NI. CREA TING A SOCIOECONOMIC A GEN\DA FOR THE
LNTERNAL MARKET
A. The Lisbon Strategoy 2000-2010
Alongside the constitutional changes found in the 1993
Treaty of Maastricht 1993 and the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam,
the European Union experimented with a new form of
policymaking and governance through the use of two
overarching policy programs addressing socioeconomic
coordination: the "Lisbon Strategy 2000-2010" and "Europe
83. See Comm. on the Internal Marl et & Consumer Protection, European
Parliament, Report on Delivering a Single 4arket to Cosurers and Citizen s
(2010/2011(1N1)), A7-0132/2010, 1[ 13-15 (Mar. 5, 2010) (by Louis Grech); see also
Comm. on Employment & Social Affairs, European Parliament, Amendrments 1-285, Dr#ai
Report: The I uture for Social Services of General Interest, 2009/2222 (INI) (Mar. 28, 2011).
84. Commission of the European Comnunities, Single Market Act: Twelve Levers
to Boost Growth and Strengthen Confidence; "Working Together to Create New
Growth:" Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2011) 206 Final. at 16
(Apr. 2011).
1388 FORDHAM INTERN\-ATIONAL LAVJOURNAL [V ol. 35:1364
2020." The latter directs and underpins current policy
coordination in the European Union.
The economic Euro-sclerosis of Europe in the 1980s and
early 1990s was initially addressed by tackling the particular
features of European unemployment (that is, high levels of
youth unemployment and long-term unemployment) through a
different set of governance mechanisms. The most notable
development during this era was the creation of the Essen
Guidelines in 1994.85 At the same time, the Commission began
to use the concept of a "European Social Model. ' 1s The
influence of a European Social Model that underpinned growth
and integration in the European Union is demonstrated in the
formulation of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, which has been
analyzed as "a compromise between the neoliberal and the
more socially-oriented governments of Member States."87 The
Essen experiment was expanded into the Lisbon Strategy, set
out by the European Council in March 2000.88 At the heart of
this strategy was a socioeconomic policy triangle that balanced
economic objectives of integration through economic growth
and competitiveness, with "more and better" jobs, social
cohesion, and environmental sustainabilityQ- This strategy was
echoed in successive policy documents attempting to transform
the European Union into "the most competitive and dynamic
know ledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social
cohesion.""
In hindsight, the Lisbon Strategy contained numerous
flaws. There was the temptation to benchmark economic growth
against the United States and Japan and the rise of the
85. See Essen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. lI., no.
12 (1994).
86. See (ommission of the European Communities, European Social Policy-A
Way Forward for the Union: White Paper from the Commission, C()M (94) 333 Final,
at 1 &Jnl. 1994) (noting the need to "preserve and develop the European social
miodel").
87. Vassilis Hatzopoulos, A (More) Social Europe: A Political Crossroad or a Legal One-
Tay? Dialogues Between Luxembourg and Lisbon. 42 (OMMON MKT. L. RLV. 1599, 1634
(2(05).
88. lisbon European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BUi. no. 3
(2000).
89. Id. [1 5-7.
90. Id. 5.
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"BRICS"' 9 economies was underestimated. -92 Critical attention
has focused both upon the policy failings of the strategy and the
new governance techniques that were introduced. Dealing
briefly with the substance of the Lisbon Strategy, many criticisms
of the strategies pursued center around the inherent tensions
between economic policy and social policy in the European
Union. 93 The perceived lack of competence to use the
Community method of legislation stalled any further measures
and explains the lack of attention to the social dimension of the
Lisbon Strategy.
Critiques of the new governance techniques have focused
on the systems' lack of transparency, accountability, and
participation.94 Criticism also has stemmed from the difficulties
of assessing self-reporting, the limitations on monitoring
Member States' responses to annual reviews, and the inherent
lack of sanctions (beyond peer pressure and the identification of
"good practice"). 95 Nonetheless, the Lisbon Strategy has been
identified as a key turning point in EU policy because it allowed
the open method of coordination ("OMC") to be labelled as an
EU governance technique, and provided the framework for
different kinds of OMC processes to emerge as forms of
experimental governance.96 However, the OMC did not meet
the expectations of creating an environment encouraging policy
exchange, where prelegal issues could be identified to move the
European Union forward into binding forms of EU law and
91. "BRICS" is an acronym fbr the states of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africea.
92. Erika Szszczak, The Evolving European Employment Strateg', in SocIAL LAW AND
POLICY IN AN EVOL\VIN EUROPEAN UNION 197, 198-99 (Jo Shaw ed., 2000) [hereinafter
Szyszczak, Evolving Europea, Employ ent Strategy]: Erika Szyszczak, The New Paradigm for
Social Policy: A tluos C- !e. 38 ( OMMON MKT. L. REV. 112 (2001) [hercinafter
Szyszczak, The New Paradign].
93. )avid Natali, The Lisbon Stratego a Decade on: A Ctical Review of a Multi-
dis cilinay Liteatqre, 15 TRANSFER: EUR. RDV. LAB. RLS. 111, 111 (2009).
94. See, e.g, Erika Szyszczak, Experimental Governance: The Open Method oj"
Coordation, 12 EUR. I.J. 486, 495 (2006).
95. See id. at 499. See generallY ARNO TAUSCH. TITANIC 20107' THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND) ITS FAILED LISBON STRATEGY (2009).
96. See Szyszczak, The New Paradigm, supra note 92, at 1125; see also Janine
Goetschy, The Lisbon Strategy and Social Euope: Two Closely Linked Destinies. in EUROPE,
GLOBALIZATION AND THE LISBON AGENDA 74, 77 (MariaJo-ao Rodrigues ed., 2009).
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policy using the traditional Community method.9 7 Despite these
limitations, Articles 5 and 6 of the TFEU explicitly find a role for
experimental governance by stating that the European Union
will support, coordinate, and supplement legislative actions,
The struggling Lisbon Strategy- was analyzed in the Kok
Report of 2004,"v and the Commission's mid-term review re-
launched the strategy towards more neoliberal goals. 10 The next
phase of socio-economic development began in a much harsher
economic climate, with an enlarged and diversified European
Union. In 2009, the European Council reinforced the new
values of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, stressing that in the next
phase of policy orientation there should be greater national
ownership of policies through active involvement of the social
partners and regional and local authorities. The Commission
addressed this shift in focus through a wide consultation process
of its new objectives for an "Europe 2020" project.
The social stakeholders consulted submitted comments
responding critically to the Commission's new agenda, and
particularly its failure to grasp the importance of social
inequalities. For example, they criticized the fight against
poverty in the European Union, in addition to established
policies such as equal treatment programs and the social
objectives of the European Union adopted during the 2000s
within the framework of the Social OMC1J 1° Thus, the revised
political and economic agendas were boosted by a social agenda
with enhanced socio-economic policy coordination. This social
agenda recognized the diversity of the Member States in order
to meet the new EU objectives of "smart, sustainable and
inclusive" growth 0 2
97. See Iisbon European Council, supra note 88. For an earlier analysis, see
Szyszczak, Evolving European Erploy ment Strateg©, supra note 92.
98. TFEU, supra note 7. arts. 5-6, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 52-53.
99. HIGH IF\TI, GRP., EUROPEAN COMMNN, FACING THE CHAIIENGE: THE I.SBON
STRATEGYFOR (ROb [H ANT) ENPI OYMENT (2004).
100. Mai) Daly, Assessing the EL Approach to Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion
in the Last Decade, in EUROPE 2020: ToWARDS A MORE SOCIAI EU?, supra note 64, at 143,
143.
101. See KLNNLTH A. ARMSTRONG, GOVERNING SOCIAL INCLUSION:
EL ROPEANIZATION THROUGH POLKY COORDINATION (Paul Craig & Grdinne de B(Irca
eds., 2010).
102. Europe 2020, supra note 82. The new policy progran is at an carly stage, but
the strategy pursued has been criticized for focusing too much on market-based growth
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In 2007, the Commission launched a reform package for
the single market that revealed a significant shift in the role of
the market"", The focus upon removing barriers to trade shifted
towards consumer and citizen needs in Europe, not only in
terms of the benefits derived from competitive markets (a
choice of products, lower prices), but also in a language of
citizenship and new values including solidarity, inclusion, and
sustainability. This included an "empowerment discourse": the
consumer-citizen should take an active role in the design and
enforcement of economic regulation.1 4 In adopting a "Citizen's
Agenda," the Commission attempted to model the citizen as a
stakeholder in a participative process of deliberation on
policymaking 05
B. New Governance Europe 2020
The new governance architecture that emerged in Europe
2020 is organized around three integrated pillars:
macroeconomic surveillance, thematic coordination, and fiscal
and ignoring qualitative indicators. See. e.g., BJ6RNI HACKER & TILL VAN TREECK. WHAT
INFI ENCE FOR Et ROPEAN (GOVRNANCE THE REFORMED STABIIITY AND (GRO FH
PACT, THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY AND THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER" (2010), avaiable at
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07724.pdft. Philippe Pochet, EU 2020: Social
Impact of the New Form ofjEurpean Goverance, ETUI POI'Y BRIEF: EUR. SOC. POI 'Y, no. 5,
2010, at 3-5; Philippe Pochet, whats Wirg ith EU2020, ETUI POt'Y BRIEFS: EUR.
SOC. POL'Y, no. 2. 2010. at 3-4; Jonathan Zeitlin, Towards a Stronger OVIC in a More
Social Europe 2020: A New Governr,e Architetuare fir EU Policy Coordination, in EUROPE
2020: ToYAR)S a MORE SOCIAI EU?, sup-a note 64, at 253, 254-55.
103. Commission of the European Commnunities, Opportunities, Access and
Solidarity: Towards a New Social Vision for 21st Century Europe: Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2007) 726 Final (Nov.
2007); Commission of the European Communities, Services of General Interest,
Including Social Services of General Interest: A New European Commitment:
Communication froth the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM
(2007) 725 Final (Nov. 2007).
104. See, e.g., Council Regulation No. 211/2011 on the Citizen's Initiative, 2011
O.J. I 65/1; I)AVIES, sora note 38, at 4-5; Briony Hoskins, Monitoring Actie Citi&nship
in the European Union: The Process, the Results and Initial Explanations. 17 CAI(MO 1
(2009).
105. Commission of the European Communities, A Single Market for 21st
(entury Europe: Conmunication friom the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Comlnittec and the Connittce of the
Regions, COM (2007) 724 Final (Nov. 2007).
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surveillance under the Stability and Growth Pact. 1' The Lisbon
Strategy has been streamlined down to five "EU headline targets
which will constitute shared objectives guiding the action of the
member States and the Union" (European Council 2010b), and
the number of Integrated Guidelines for employment and
economic policies has been streamlined down to ten.
Significantly, the social objectives of Europe 2020 found in
Guideline 10 include "promoting social inclusion and
combating poverty."10 7
One innovation of the Europe 2020 program introduces a
"European Semester" beginning in March of each year, which
would consider the advice and responses from Member States
on prospective budgetary strategies. The innovation goes no
further, but relies on soft instruments of governance to monitor
the performance targets. There is greater emphasis on
supervision of Member States, the ability to make Member State
specific recommendations, and the ability to issue policy
warnings to Member States.'I,
VII. THE MONTI REPORT AJVD THE SINGLE MARKET ACT
2011
The adoption of the Europe 2020 program was
complemented by a parallel governance process: a report on the
future of the internal market commissioned by the President of
the Commission and presented by the former Competition
Commissioner, Mario Monti.10 9 Following this report, the
Commission published Towards a Single MVarket Act for a Highly
Competitive Social Market Economy, outlining fifty measures to
relaunch the internal market in 2012. This was adopted as The
Single Alarhet Act in April 2011 and included twelve broad areas
106. See Economic Governane, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.Curopa.Cu/
e urope2020/cuiropc-2020-in -a-nutshell priorities economic-governancei
index en.htm (last updated june 14, 2012).
107. Bea (antillon, Disambiguating Lisbon, Growth, Employmert and Social Jcusioa
in the Investment State 23-25 (Ctr. for Soc. Pol'y, Working Paper No. 10/07, 2010).
107. See EU Weber States, EUR. (OMMISSION, http://cc.curopa.eu/curopc202/
who-docs-w hat/cmber-s tates/ index en. htm (last updated May 16, 2012).
109. MARIO MONTI. ANEW STRATEGY FOR THE SIN( AE MARKET: ;T THE SERIICE OF
EUROPE'S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (2010).
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of action. 110 Within each area, a further modernization and
distinction process has taken place.
The aims of this process are unashamedly economic: to
kick-start the sluggish European economy in order to counteract
the crisis in the Eurozone. In terms of socioeconomic values,
procurement policy can function as a case study that recognizes
the legitimate combination of environmentally sustainable,
socially responsible factors alongside local social services
responsive to local needs."' This mirrors a similar approach
taken towards the modernization of public service financing,
where a mix of Commission policy documents and revised hard
law attempt to implement the aims of Article 14 and Protocol
No. 26 of the TFEU.11 2 The positive role of public services was
acknowledged in the Monti Report and is seen in a speech by
the Vice President of the Commission, Joaquim Almunia. I3 This
is a distinct departure from the past role of litigation concerning
public services, where challenges to a Member State's welfare
services were viewed as negative integration and the justification
for the service was seen as derogation from the fundamental
free market rules. In the Single Market Act of 2011, public
services are discussed in the context of social cohesion. They are
seen as essential building blocks of the European Social Model,
which is highly competitive and socially inclusive.
The collection of documents and communications
surrounding the 2011 Single Market Act alludes to another new
governance process that has emerged as a means of developing
a highly competitive social market economy through targeted
areas. The communications suggest a policy of avoiding conflicts
between Member States by modernizing and recasting existing
legislation and formalizing soft law into definitive documents
explaining law and policy.1 4 The use of these processes avoids
110. The use of "Act" in the title is confusing for common lawyers. The
document's legal status is that of a piece of soft law. See The Single Market Act. EUR.
COMMISSION, http://ecC.europa.eu/internal-markct /sact/index-en.hm (last
updated Mav 4, 2012).
111. Commission Press Release. iP/11 /1580 (Nov. 20, 2011).
112. See Scminchnann, supra note 57 (discussing the financing of public services).
113. Joaqufn Almunia, Vice President, Eur. Comm'n Responsible for Competition
Poliw, Address at the College of Europe in Bruges, SGEI Reform: Presenting the Draft
Legislation (Sept. 30. 2011) (alluding to the language of Article 14 of the TFEU).
114. For further discussion, see Siyszczak, supra note 14.
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direct confrontations between the Member States in the Council
of the European Union and successfully allows linguistic tools to
combine socioeconomic principles into economic policy.
In the wake of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, there has been a
greater use of tougher forms of new governance processes and
soft law. The new communications are peppered with the "new"
ELU language, with references to solidarity, subsidiaritv, and
citizenship in the new, highly competitive social market
economy. These documents are weightier than previous forms
of soft law. Many are normative in character, and are
authoritative "handbooks" on how to apply ELF law. The use of
such processes avoids the need to find consensus amongst
twenty-seven Member States, and avoids ELU appropriation of
localized goods and services that could have a less significant
impression on the integration process. The impact of the 2009
Treaty of Lisbon is seen in the recognition that small and local
goods and services (especially social services) may be offered
more efficiently (and with greater diversity and sensitivity
towards consumer needs) without the centralized intervention
of EU law. But for larger projects, the "more economic
approach" towards design and delive ry of goods and s rvices is
paramount. Competition issues drive the modernization
agendas of social protection, financing public services, and
procurement. This reinforces the prediction by Buendia Sierra
that the integration of competition into the internal market
objective has indeed strengthened the role of competition
policy, with a subtle penetration into areas where the
Commission and the European Courts previously took a more
cautious and sensitive approach."5
CONTCL USION
This Essay has charted how the changes from the 1993
Treaty of Maastricht to the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon have
linguistically altered the predominantly economic integration
focus of the European Union, creating the legal basis for greater
recognition of socioeconomic values in the construction of a
constitutional document for the European Union. This Essay
has shown that these are not entirely new; different conceptual
115. See Buendia Sierra, supra note 10, at 347-66.
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forms are found in earlier EU policy documents and case law. In
terms of a fundamental change from the original EEC Treaty, to
the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht, to the changes ushered in with
the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, the process of European integration
has shifted from purely economic considerations towards a
socioeconomic model, underpinned by fundamental rights
concepts.
An initial assessment of the legal base for socioeconomic
rights in Europe suggested that the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon was
too much of a compromise:
[T] he European Social model which is emerging from the
Treaty of Lisbon 2007 seems to contain a little of even thing,
acknowledging the wide political differences on the future
direction of European integration combing a mix of
competition, free market and solidarity based principles.11 6
In particular, there was little guidance on how Article 7 of
the TFEU would influence policymaking or the legal reasoning
of the European Courts. One practical role for the new mix of
values was identified in that "this new mix of aims, combined
with human, or fundamental rights, ambitions will probably be
recorded in the ever lengthening Preambles to new pieces of
union legislation and soft law communications."1 1 7
Three years later, the impact of the new balance between
economic and social values has not been seen in cases before
the European Courts. Greater visibility is seen in policymaking.
The role of new governance processes and soft law was seized
upon by the Commission as a means of using the language of
the new blend of socioeconomic values to forge a modernization
process. Counterbalancing this, the economic downturn
propelled competitiveness issues to the front of the European
political agenda."I Returning to the quotation that introduced
this discussion, we are led to conclude that the future of the
European Union remains in the balance: a fantastic object.
1 l6. Szyszczak, supra note 59, at 280.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Joaqufn Alinunia. Vice President. Eur. Coin'n Responsible for
Competition Policy, The Future of Europe Address in Brussels: Improving Europe's
Comnpetitiveness in the Global Economy Jan. 17, 2012), available at
http: c/uropa.eui/rapid /pressReleassAction.do'reference-SPEE(H /12/1 1&foriiat-
HTML &aged-0&language-EN&gui! .anguage-en.
